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Abstract: Egypt and Turkey makeup about half of the whole population of the Middle East and are the two leading nations in the 
eastern Mediterranean, including Iran as a whole. Both countries are now recognized as the two most tremendous modern 
military forces in the Middle East. Besides, Cairo and Ankara are major Muslim centers: the Al-Azhar Mosque in Egypt is the 
largest Islamic University in the world and a significant feature of Egyptian soft power; the historical association between Turkey 
and the last Islamic Caliphate is viewed in the region with great nostalgia. Given these similarities, a deep rivalry between the two 
countries exists around the world, while Ankara and Cairo have increasingly prevented overt aggression or conflicts. After the 
Arab Spring, tensions have intensified and, in effect, impacts Libya, Sudan, and the Eastern Mediterranean region. Along with the 
increased risk of an overt war between the two nations, the rivalry between Turkey and Egypt also challenges the delicate security 
of the Middle East. It indicates that it needs an international mediator to answer this thorny problem. 
  





Following Gaddafi's removal in October 2011, there was an immediate leadership 
vacuum that led to extensive violence, a refugee crisis, and increased tribal conflicts, as 
well as economic instability and social welfare collapse. Libya is fractured, polarized, and 
insecure today. It is a failed state in many ways without a unified representative and 
lawful government capable of exercising authority or monopolizing the use of force. To 
establish a complete settlement between different factions in Libya, the country's 
political and security situation is extremely complex. Libya's political spectrum was split 
in two by the 2014 civil war: the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and 
its opposition in the country's eastern part. Khalifa Haftar, leader of the self-styled 
Libyan National Army (LNA) from the Eastern region, launched an offensive to seize 
Tripoli from the internationally recognized government. There have been more conflicts 
since Haftar took control of the capital. An important contributing element to Libya's 
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political fragmentation and polarization has been the meddling of international powers. 
Political or regional interests of other countries have been a constant aspect of the post-
revolutionary conflict. Recently, the Turkish approach to Libya has been mostly value-
driven. Turkish involvement in Libya's conflict has increased since Gaddafi's 
administration fell. An important backer of the GNA is Turkey. 
The GNA's recent progress against Khalifa Haftar's so-called Libyan National 
Army (LNA) has changed the course of the Libyan civil war since June 2020 (Alimi et al. 
2016). They and their international supporters have yet to come up with a persuasive 
diplomatic approach. Mistrust between Turkey and Egypt is a major hurdle to diplomatic 
progress. To reach a diplomatic agreement that can end Libya's civil war, both parties 
must be on board. A unilateral solution to Libya's problem is not an option for either 
country. It's no secret that both Ankara and Cairo (two major Muslim centers in Egypt) 
are at odds with one another. 
While both Egypt and Turkey are aware of and recognize each other's interests 
and vulnerabilities in the Libya issue, none party fully understands or respects the 
others. Instead, they see the other's viewpoint as a hindrance to the realization of their 
essential national security and economic objectives. Turkish-Egyptian rifts make it 
possible for sabotage to take place (Alimi et al. 2016). 
The Egyptian side wanted to offer a military response concerning the Libyan Civil 
War with the leadership position of a strong man. They felt they should usher in Haftar 
as the next Moammar Gaddafi from Libya with assistance from France, the United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the USA (Parchami 2012). They intended to more 
conveniently smash the Islamist groups in Libya and establish a down-grading authority 
through a general with secular credentials. But the Haftar paradigm in Libya crashed 
over the last few weeks, and Haftar was not an asset but a liability for the Egyptian side 
of the region. Haftar was not adequately powerful, wise, or capable to peacefully lead 
Libya. He was diminished in reputation by his most recent actions against the denials of 
Libya‟s diplomatic accord, attacks on GNA-controlled civilian installations, and war 
crimes. Haftar‟s alleged Medkhali Salafis are not moderate actors and are funded by 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
Parchami (2012) asserts that the Medkhali Salafis committed horrific human 
rights abuses in Tarhuna and in other areas where they had a significant impact. Haftar's 
partnership with the Medkhalis runs counter to the secular model that is often used to 
justify him. It is not appropriate for Egypt to sponsor Warlord Haftar with support and 
motivation from the UAE and other allies. Haftar is a warlord and terrorist who 
committed war crimes in Libya. In an international inquiry, his foreign partners will also 
be investigated (Chase 2016). A mutual agreement between Egypt and Turkey would 
protect the interests of both countries in the East Mediterranean. The deal with Greece 
and the Greek Cypriot government is not aligned with Egypt's Eastern Mediterranean 
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long-term interests. Similar to that between Libya and Turkey, maritime demarcation 
arrangements between Turkey and Egypt will support the interests of both parties.  
Turkey and Egypt can have some political differences, and leadership differences 
may have adverse effects on relations, but productive discussion on the lower level is 
not stopped. The geographical ground and the profound cultural and historical ties 
between the two countries are not more important than ideological differences. The 
long-term interests of Egypt will bring even greater Turkish-Egyptian partnership than 
Cairo‟s current alliance with Abu Dhabi and Riyadh (Beck n.d.). The aspirations of Saudi 
and Emirates lead to chaos in Yemen. Specifically, Saudi Arabia, in particular, was an 
unpleasant experience. Disagreements and competition between Turkey and Egypt raise 
the susceptibility of Libya to international intervention. Both countries should break up 
their ties and progress in the areas of common interest. Turkey and Egypt have 
continued to continue to strengthen their economic relations amid geopolitical tensions 
(Alimi et al. 2016). This enduring friendship between the two countries avoided further 
degradation in the trading field. There are also substantial business and trade 
opportunities with Egypt. There are no gaps between the two countries on social and 
cultural grounds. Egypt is worried about Turkey's Muslim Fraternity ties, but it does not 
have any purpose, through the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), to shape Egyptian domestic 
policy.   
Now is the best time for Turkey and Egypt to split and move on, at least in the 
Libyan view. Libya could be more a bridge than a hurdle to improving Ankara-Cairo 
relations (Parchami 2012). The Libyan players themselves determine the finishing line in 
the civil war in Libya, but the mutual understanding between Turkey and Egypt will play 




Egypt's regime, under President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, declared the Muslim 
Brotherhood a terrorist group that has taken dozens of its members to prison and self-
exile in Turkey, Qatar, and Western Europe, following the 2013 ousting of Egyptian 
Mohamed Morsi, backed by a Muslim Brotherhood. After the crackdown, the expelled 
members also had an impact on Egypt. The new Egyptian administration itself is of 
considerable concern. Egypt's support of the GNA, and in particular, many influential 
persons has been firmly impelled by the Libyan branch of the MB and the LNA. 
President Al-Sisi expressed fear that MB voices in the GNA are a significant danger to 
national security in Egypt as the MB may use Libya‟s proximity to Egypt to conduct 
resistance campaigns around the Egyptian region. The GNA's new president Khaled Al-
Mashiri said that his presidency was a significant concern. The LNA support from Egypt 
has led to a proxy war with Turkey that supports GNA through military consultants, 
troops, intelligence, and air support. It is also possible to trace this proxy war back to the 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Volume 7 · Number 3 · 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 359 
opposition of Turkey‟s President Erdogan to the ouster of former President Morsi and 
his government. Turkey has publicly supported President el-Sissi's rule, thus improving 
the once warm ties between both nations. Turkey provides the influential MB leaders of 
Egypt with a haven. Egypt has assisted with all kinds, including but not limited to, the 
LNA's preparation and the start of operations in western Egypt, especially at the 
beginning of the conflict. Cheap Libyan oil was also a significant source of funding for 
the LNA in Egypt. As the LNA governs eastern Libya's oil-rich fields, it has become clear 
that Egypt has provided oil at a reduced pace in return for funding from the LNA. In this 
regard, this project sought to investigate the Egypt-Turkey relations in Libya by clearly 




Two main limitations limited the breadth and scale of this research. First, there is 
a general shortage of objective evidence from the previous studies related to this topic 
that might have helped to identify the research gap. Although there are many 
references, most do not have the Egyptian perspective and are restricted to a specific 
period or event. Finally, the revolution's complexity makes many aspiring authors and 
academics hesitant for reputation reasons to write on the issue. All these factors 
generate confusion and ambiguity in science in the preparation of solid materials and 




Three delimitations are applicable in addition to the limitations set out in the 
previous paragraphs. First of all, the study is unclassified.  Secondly, the study will 
concentrate mainly on the EAF's role in the revolution. It will offer comprehensive 
insights into the transitional political structure by paying particular emphasis to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, the study gives a philosophical view. This perspective 
includes the thoughts of the author and does not reflect the official policy or plan of the 




The majority of the study technique is based on reading and analyzing the 
Turkish foreign policy process in the Middle East through an examination of a group of 
options, which is known as „forecasting‟ or „scenario analysis‟, as well as other methods 
of analysis. The scenario analysis is the most important method of predicting the future; 
nevertheless, this research does not present a single image of expectations or scenarios 
but rather presents many dynamic choices for the future of Turkish and Egyptian foreign 
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policy in the next years. Consequently, a descriptive analysis of Turkish and Egyptian 
foreign policy, which is based on the idea of shared interest, can be used to determine 
the range of probable outcomes for any scenario under consideration.  
The study of each scenario may be utilized for „extrapolation of the past‟, which 
means that it will rely on historical data or information and conclude that it will be used 
to foretell the future. In addition, the research attempts to examine all of the prospective 
improvements in Turkish and Egyptian foreign policy that may be made in international 
relations. In the end, the scenario analysis has often authorized several scenarios 
through „scenario analysis‟, which illustrates the potential repercussions in the future 




The Roots of the Libyan Crisis 
 
Libya had entirely different conditions in 2011 from Tunisia and Egypt. While the 
Libyan people, along with their excellent economic success, were ruled by an autocratic 
leadership, the bulk of the country had a relatively small population. The oil and gas 
industry has been able to absorb the majority of the country's qualified staff, which 
allows the rest to profit. A structure of allegiance developed over the years by alliances, 
nepotism, and money ensured tight political and security restrictions allowed President 
Muammar Gaddafi to retain power for an extraordinarily long time (Davutoglu 2013).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, Gaddafi avoided battles with the United States and 
slowly established relations with the West and in Congo. In Libya, in 2011, there were no 
major clandestine resistance movements as the mainstream conflict was limited to a few 
people in the diaspora (Parchami 2012). Nobody predicted a Benghazi uprising or revolt 
in 2011 when Libya was considered to be one of the region's most prosperous nations. 
The outbreak of abuse in Cyrenaica‟s cities has shaken most of the countries of Europe, 
and that's why they have sent vague and misleading tweets.  
Even Gaddafi was stunned and puzzled at the beginning of the 2000s; he was 
accepted as a victorious head of state, venerated by Europeans and supported by the US 
(Mezran 2012). Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that something different from 
merely revolting and more nuanced than mere local insubordination was occurring in 
the eastern territory of Cyrenaica. At the beginning of the coordinated action sequence, 
the presence of a vast volume of guns and ammunition and appearance at the ground 
level of a range of objectives showed the appearance of a strategy, inconsistent with a 
little upheaval. Another central element is the swift responses of some European 
governments, especially those of France and Britain, which almost universally embraced 
anti-government positions.  
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Massive worldwide media reporting started transmitting an account of the Libyan 
situation, primarily based on the concept of brutal government response to a nonviolent 
public rebellion. The primary source of this report is the Qatari-based Al-Jazeera news 
network that has pioneered the systematization of photos of violence, chaos, anger, and 
death, persuading Europeans of Gaddafi's genocide to ensure his continued influence 
and rights (Al-Jazeera 2011). Many of the news reports that were shared regularly with 
western families explain how Gaddafi's air force targeted populated cities 
indiscriminately, killing thousands of civilian victims. The story was that it needed to be 
halted at all costs with the help of the international community (Krauss 2011). 
A hesitant NATO and much more hesitant the US then embarked on a brief but 
comprehensive campaign directed at Libya's governmental properties on the ground, 
killed the local air force, prevented Benghazi from becoming loyalist. Gaddafi's defenses 
rapidly were damaged by the bombing, finally leaving the capital, a refuge in Sirte, his 
born place, and his tribal origins (Mezran 2014). Gaddafi finally was assassinated when 
he moved from one position to another quickly and refused to surrender to an 




Egypt‟s effort to form a national defense alliance against Turkey was heavily 
stressed in recent media reports. This relation is the latest episode of strained relations 
between both countries, which have been experiencing hostile ties since summer 2013, 
following General Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi's military coup d'état, which has ousted late 
Mohamed Morsi from control. To establish the so-called „defense coalition‟ that would 
be against Turkish involvement in the country, Abbas Kamel, Egypt's head of 
intelligence, has met with his counterparts in northern African countries. Egyptian and 
Libyan reports also confirm that “Egypt has formed an army commando force with 
Libyan activists to avoid Turkish ships from supplying assistance for Tripoli's 
internationally recognized government” (Alessia 2021; Omar 2014). These diplomatic 
and military tensions between Egypt and Turkey have many consequences for the 
Middle East and North Africa's peace and defense. Egypt's relations with Turkey have 
deteriorated considerably since the Egyptian coup in 2013. Turkish President Erdogan 
condemned and took over Morsi's followers, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, for the 
ousting of President Morsi. President Sisi, on his part, considers Turkey as a regional 
enemy and does not acknowledge its growing position and influence, especially in Libya 
and the Eastern Mediterranean. In the run-up to 2013, Turkey and Egypt had good and 
increasing ties, particularly in the aftermath of the Egyptian uprising in 2011 when their 
economic and geostrategic relationship was reinforced in both countries. Turkey 
interacted with the January 2011 Cairo - and the Arab Spring in general - revolt as a 
means of increasing its control in the region. It tried to create an alliance with new 
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powers in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and elsewhere, primarily with Islamists, in a 
geostrategic way that contradicted Ankara in the regional status quo. 
The Turkish-Egyptian relations started to get worse after the breakdown of 
Egypt‟s transformation and the re-emergence there of the so-called „deep state‟. 
President Erdogan became very critical of the post-coup regime and endorsed the anti-
coup demonstrations led by the Muslim Brotherhood after the Rabaa massacre of 2013, 
which involved the killing of hundreds of peaceful protestors by Egyptian police. Egypt 
recalled the ambassador to Turkey in August 2013, not unexpectedly. A couple of 
months later, the Turkish ambassador to the world was expulsed from Cairo, and 
President Erdogan responded angrily, saying that “he would never honor those who 
come to power by military coups” (Christopher 2016). 
 
THE GEOPOLITICAL INCENTIVE 
 
Turkey has a significant regional presence in its geographical location, one which 
has traditionally enabled the growth of the Ottoman Empire. It is a predominantly 
Eurasian country in the Middle East and the Caspian Basin, bordered by states of Europe, 
Asia, the Near East, and the Black Sea. The strategic role of Turkey makes itself a stable 
political, economic, and cultural force that can serve as an initiator in development, a 
global peace hub, and a facilitator for the incremental extension of democratic values. 
Egypt, as well, played a crucial part in world affairs, with its geographically unique 
geopolitical location. Based in North Africa, across the Nile River, Egypt wants adequate 
diplomatic relations with a variety of countries on the international level, with a diverse 
position at the center of the African, Arabs, and Islamic spheres (Nasser 1952, 51) and its 
immense geographical, commercial, and cultural significance. Furthermore, its Sinai 
crossroads connect Africa to Asia. Egypt is like “the center of the world, the great 
highway of nations”, as defined by Alfred Milner (1899) - Under-Secretary of Finance 
from 1869–1892, and many foreign economies depend on it to conduct an export trade 
(Milner 1899). 
 
Ideological Animosity or Geostrategic Rivalry? 
 
Several factors, such as geography, culture, economy, history, natural capital, 
economic growth, and special interests, typically direct and influence foreign policy. This 
animosity is a mixture of all these considerations in the case of Turkey and Egypt 
(Cafiero and Wagner 2019). Both countries have a long past heritage, national identity, 
geostrategic value, and sincere ambition for global influence and are regarded as central 
players in the Middle East. Over the past couple of decades, Turkey‟s foreign policy has 
changed its emphasis from Europe and the Middle East, notably after it failed to join the 
European Union by engaging in its long-standing relationship with the region.  
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Since the Arab Spring, however, the geographical position of Turkey has created 
fears and doubts among Arab authoritarian regimes, which, despite Erdogan's support 
for Arab Islamists, have begun to view Ankara as a strategic and ideological challenge to 
them. Such anxieties worsened as Turkey backed the Muslim Brotherhood after Morsi 
was ousted from office in 2013. While some observers prefer to look at his Islamist 
neighbors in terms of Erdogan's foreign policy against the Arab world, the battle 
between Turkey and its regional rivals, and especially Egypt in particular, is not to be 
overlooked nor underestimated. He was celebrated in the Arab streets and welcomed 
before the Arab Spring in the city's capital cities for his stance toward Israel and Iran, 
with his Islamic background in full recognition. Thus, political as well as strategic 




The relations between Egypt and Turkey are characterized by three main issues, 
especially after Sisi (Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi), came to power as 
president of Egypt in 2014. Firstly, each country's geographical position and impact. 
Although Turkey views the Arab Middle East as the backyard in which power and control 
are wielded, Sisi thinks that the Turkish situation is a source of chaos and uncertainty. 
This inherent difference in their approach to foreign policy helps to identify and form 
the attitude of both countries to each other and the entire world. 
Furthermore, President Sisi's rise to power was combined with a patriotic 
nationalist feeling regarding the ancient presence of his country in the Arab world. 
Despite its lack of economic and financial capabilities, it seeks to rebuild the role and 
image of Egypt. 
The competition between Cairo and Ankara can be seen in two regional issues, at 
least: Libya and the East Mediterranean. In Libya, it was General Khalifa Haftar, a leading 
backer of the warlord, who has launched a military campaign against the official, UN-
recognized National Accord Government (GNA) headquartered in Tripoli. Turkey's 
decision to send GNA military and logistical assistance escalated tensions with Egypt, 
which formally condemned the Turkish campaign and cautioned that “Turkey should 
have full responsibility for its effects”, which would have a “significant impact on the 
security of the Mediterranean area” ( Aylin 2014). 
The second issue involves the discovery of vast natural gas deposits in the 
Eastern Mediterranean region, adding fuel to the tensions that remain between Egypt 
and Turkey. In 2015, Egypt found massive natural gas reserves in Eastern Mediterranean 
waters. It started to use them to exploit Turkey economically and geostrategically, to 
establish relations with Turkey's antagonists in the Mediterranean, namely, Greece and 
Cyprus. Turkey has omitted Cyprus, Israel, Greece, Jordan, Palestinian, and Italy, as well 
as Egypt from this newly formed eastern Mediterranean gas forum (EMGF) in 2019.  
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The EMGF is intended to increase the production of natural gas in the region and 
to establish a national energy market capable of exporting gas to Europe.  
Turkey‟s exit from this forum was further proof of the region's increasing conflict, 
despite its geostrategic importance and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Egypt 
then vehemently opposed Turkey and told the United Nations Security Council to 
revoke it when it signed the security and maritime deal to the GNA. According to the 
agreement with the GNO of Libya, the naval warships in Turkey will exploit gas reserves 
in the eastern Mediterranean and ruin the ambitions of the EMGF. 
The third issue that defines relations between Egypt and Turkey is the Egypt-Gulf 
Alliance, particularly between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Over the last 
couple of years, tensions have risen among Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia, and the 
UAE. After a brief period of fiscal, military, and trade cooperation from 2011 to 2015, the 
relationship between both parties was characterized by growing mistrust and conflict. 
Three key developments have intensified these strains: the aftermath of the 
Erdogan coup attempt in July 2016, the Qatar boycott starting in June 2017, and in 
October 2018, Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated at the Saudi consulate 
in Istanbul. Indeed, some analysts refer to the role of Emirates in the attempt of coup 
d'état against Erdogan. However, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt blockaded 
Qatar, which now hosts a Turkish military base, resulting in closer diplomatic ties with 
Qatar. The anti-Turkish feeling in the blocking countries has increased with this growth.  
Finally, the assassination of the Khashoggi raised tensions toward Saudi Arabia, a 
significant friend and supporter of the Sisi regime. The three countries (Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and the UAE) reinforced the anti-Turkey Coalition; as this Coalition grows, the 
more intense the feelings of hostility spread towards Turkey. A significant role in the 
dispute with Sisi's regime is Turkish support for Egypt‟s political oppositions, especially 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey offered the Muslim Brotherhood founders and leaders 
asylum after the coup in 2013.  
Besides, it also allows free operation and transmission from Istanbul of the anti-
Sisi media networks. Turkish actions threaten the government of Sisi, accusing Turkey of 
funding Egyptian extremism and instability. In fact, in reaction to the deal with the 
Libyan GNA in Turkey, Egyptian Parliamentarians last January called for the boycott of 
Turkish goods. At a fundamental level, Turkey must give up supporting the Brotherhood 
for the normalization of relations with Egypt. Egypt made it known when its Foreign 
Affairs Ministry declared in 2016 that it “is ready to normalize its relations with Turkey 
provided it recognized the validity of the overthrow of power from former President 
Mohamed Morsi” (Khalil Al-anani 2020). This was after Binali Yıldırım, former Prime 
Minister of Turkey, indicated that the “normalization of Egypt is probable” (Daily Sabah 
2021). Ironically, their economic relations have evolved dramatically over the past couple 
of years, given the political tensions between Turkey and Egypt. According to the study 
of Egyptian-Turkish trade “Egypt and Turkey set the trade record of bilateral exports 
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between the two countries in 2018: 3,05 billion dollars in Turkish exports to Egypt, up 
29,4% from 2017 and 2,19 billion dollars for Egyptian exports to Turkey, an increase of 
9,68% over the same period” (Rami 2019). 
However, while some Egyptian parliamentarians have called for its annulment, the 
FTA concluded in 2005 remains unchanged. Nevertheless, despite the tough economic 
circumstances facing his country, Sisi is keen to preserve trade relations with Turkey. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION 
 
Egypt and Turkey have enormous consequences for global security and stability 
as per their diplomatic split. Firstly, regional rivalries and more tensions have increased 
among the major players in the region. Turkey has immersed itself in nearly all of the 
Arab wars and hot areas, including Syria, Yemen, Libya, and the Gulf, over the past 
couple of years. Furthermore, these tensions of relations between Egypt and Turkey 
have redefined the rules of the game in a world that has formed new alliances and 
replaced the leading countries with the current confrontation map. While Egypt builds a 
strong partnership with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Turkey has become Qatar's major 
strategically; after the 2017 blockade of Qatar, tensions within the Gulf have been 
steadily escalating. For the first time in the history of the Region, Israel was included in 
the alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab States. Within this new 
alliance, Israel has helped to steer the flow of hostility against others, including Iran and 
Turkey. The world today is primarily separated into two groups: on the one hand, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, and on the other, Turkey, Iran, and 
Qatar. Those two parties are disputing the area in different ways, and the tensions 
between the two sides are strengthened as the Coalition within each block strengthens. 
Third, the troubled countries like Iraq, Libya, and Palestine have been intensified 
in Egypt-Turkey tensions. The growing position and involvement of Turkey in this area 
have generated problems with Arab governments who aim to counterbalance Turkey‟s 
presence at all costs in the region. To this end, the anti-Turkey powers in their countries 
provide massive military, economic and political assistance. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Results 
 
The study found out that the latest Turkish forces' military withdrawal from the 
western part of the country in Libya and Libya National Army (LNA) General Halifa Haftar 
has provided a new balance in the conflict. It may well be a moment of watching over 
Libya, mainly because of the so-called Cairo Declaration of June 6, 2020, Egypt, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Russia may reconsider their sponsorship of Haftar and make 
a potential agreement on Libya. Haftar is losing domestically and internationally - inside 
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his powers to Egypt and the United Arab Emirates - to the extent, nobody is going to be 
betting on it again. Within this dynamic situation, neighboring Egypt, which 
strengthened Haftar since 2014, will play a significant new part in safeguarding its 
particular interests abroad and in Libya. Egypt's internal security and political integrity 
are significantly challenging to the situation in Libya. In the process of Cairo‟s strategic 
alignment and funding for the War of Haftar against the Tripoli's State, the National 
Agreement (GNA) became a significant geopolitical concern since 2013, supported by 
Turkey and Qatar. This dispute has been of great geopolitical significance for Cairo. 
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Binali Yıldırım Sisi never concealed his 
support for a military solution to Haftar, a strongman of Libya's East, and the so-called 
LNA, following numerous efforts to appear as a mediator in the conflict - as was the 
case during the unsuccessful meeting held in Kairo in February 2017. In turn, the region 
is at the forefront of Egyptian interests, as the asymmetrical menace along the 1,115 
kilometers long boundary between the two countries is steadily sought after to control 
and secure. Over the past few years, Egypt's efforts have taken several steps to secure 
the vulnerable borders and deter dangerous jihadi infiltration into Egypt from the East. 
This ideology is focused on guaranteeing the deployment of field armies in a counter-
terrorism mission and the start of a significant military campaign called Rad 24 in the 
West area close to the Siloam check-point. An emphasis has been put on the security of 
the North of Sinai. This strategic area has suffered numerous attacks by Wilayat Sinai 
associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).  
From Cairo's point of view, a potential spill of conflict could establish a volatile 
collision of interests with radicalized Muslim Brotherhood factions working both in 
Eastern Libya and the Western Desert of Egypt. 
Recent events in Libya are threatening the unsustainability of Egypt's role. Cairo is 
based upon the relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Financial support to the 
Gulf is crucial for stabilization in Egypt, particularly in the course of a Covid-19 
pandemic, which has overwhelmed Egypt's health care system; the number of confirmed 
cases has risen steadily, with more than 1000 infections a day since May 28, 2020 
(Sudarsan 2020). Yet Cairo impatiently sees the inflexibility and low political acuity of the 
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East as in the Libyan problem. 
The rising strains with Turkey, which is now Tripoli's biggest ally, make the game 
more difficult in Libya. Such comparisons emerged from relations that were already 
deteriorating. Indeed, the two governments are on their way to a confrontation on a 
multitude of political and economic problems, such as Turkish sponsorship of secular 
Islam and geo-economic tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. The establishment of an 
Eastern Mediterranean gas platform, which is firmly backed by Al-Sisi, threatens not only 
diminishing the value of Turkey's TANAP and Turkish Stream pipelines but also 
marginalizing Ankara from investment ventures for the Eastern Mediterranean gas 
exploitation. President Erdogan responded with his usual harshness to this threat. 
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Turkey reached on November 27, 2019, and Understanding with the GNA, breaking 
international law on the delimitation of national waters on the boundary of its respective 
Commercial Exclusive Zones (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean (Heinz 2021). Ankara 
agreed to support the struggle against Haftar forces and radicalized the position of 
Ankara and sparked diplomatic confrontations in Libya and led Ankara to react at all 
levels - not merely in the energy field (Heinz 2021). 
The strained ties between Al-Sisi and Haftar are the most complicating issues in 
Egypt in Libya. Most recently, in Libya, Egypt, which perceives Libya as a theatre for 
economic and diplomatic reinforcement, is interested. The weak political and military 
leadership of Haftar might weaken Egyptian aspirations in this way. Interviews with 
many non-official Egyptian outlets reveal that Haftar is committed more to his external 
sponsor's resources than to his leadership skills. Haftar has also disclosed several other 
explanations for strained relations in his military failure, such as Watiya and Tarhuna and 
other civil war failures with the GNA. First, Egypt is not happy with the LNA's military 
operations in western Libya. Second, it is very annoyed with Haftar and its tactical 
flirtations with Gulf allies in Libyan, particularly in its inconclusive year of siege against 
Tripoli. Ultimately, the vague approach of Haftar is likely to undermine the reputation of 
Egypt in its geopolitical vicinity, as well as to jeopardize the hope of an Egyptian foreign 
policy that is capable of distancing itself from the hegemonies of Saudi-Emirates and 
Saudi Arabs in the Middle East. So, what do we expect from the dispute?  
Russia's latest developments in Libya and multi-faceted Egyptian projects – such 
as Italy's so-called Cairo Declaration and multi-billion weapons – may contribute to the 
complexities of that. One could believe Moscow preferred to prevent further 
intervention in the dispute, but that it will not necessarily allow Haftar to be defeated 
(McGregor 2018). If the policy of the Kremlin is to take over the mediating power of the 
potential future negotiations with Turkey, Haftar can become a bargaining pawn outside 
the internal dynamics of Libya. Their repercussions will have international ramifications, 
maybe even the Syrian crisis, which, amid co-led diplomatic attempts, still sees Russia 
and Turkey on the other side. 
This might sound like a warning bell to Haftar and her allies, advising them to 
consolidate their position in the East concerning possible talks with Turkey and the 
Tripoli administration. The Gulf monarchies, the most committed proponents of the 
Haftar up to now, should follow the line indicated by Moscow - not involved in pursuing 
a war that they do not consider as winners. Egypt may, therefore, benefit from the crisis 
in Haftar and, for the medium term at least, seek to find more trustworthy political 
alternatives. Besides, Egypt should still see sponsorship of Haftar as a simple short-term 
option, as appropriate substitutions are not possible. Around the same time, Haftar's 
assistance is a realistic means to control, from the Egyptian viewpoint to foreign policy, 
Turkish maritime, and defense assertiveness in Libya and the broader Mediterranean. 
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Discussion and Normalization 
 
Cooperation between Egypt and Turkey would provide the ability to improve its 
regional leadership role. Egypt will benefit from the political planning stage from Turkish 
economic policies aimed at making the budgetary policy more stable, monetary policy 
was more efficient, and the financial system more confident. Turkey and Egypt should 
use their roles to jointly establish a national security framework to counter the ongoing 
terrorist threat that afflicts the Libya crisis. The country will benefit and help restore 
peace by coordinated joint action through a comprehensive anti-terrorism policy 
partnership between military, intelligence, law enforcement, and the diplomatic fields. 
The joint effort will include the capability of partners, the creation of skilled 
security forces; internal defense support; and the execution of special operations (Jones 
2014). The transformation of Turkey was made possible through the political and 
economic reforms of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that resulted in stability 
and credibility. Since 2002, the state has concentrated on increasing domestic capital 
spending, foreign direct investment, commerce, and trading partners through its 
economic, fiscal, and monetary policies (Tolga 2013). Within a more stable environment, 
both domestic and international business groups will better organize long-term market 
plans. 
Turkey was slowly moved from conventional agriculture to industrial cultivation 
and more advanced manufacturing, rendering it the ninth largest country in the world, a 
significant trade partner for the EU, and a center of economic growth. 
Turkey also took on a role in transportation from Caspian, Central Asia, the 
Atlantic, and the Eastern Mediterranean as a conduit and as a power bridge through 
vast amounts of hydrocarbon supplies to the European Union (Roberts 2004). Turkish 
aircraft is one of the most congested transit points of fuel in the world with several 
international and domestic pipelines in addition to the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, 
averaging 3 million barrels per day. Its central position as a transport center is expected 
to grow in the coming years, as 70% of the world's oil and natural gas reserves are 
located in the region (Tolga 2013). 
Egypt, on the other hand, has considerable potential for expansion and is one of 
the most advanced and diversified economies in MENA (UNECA 2013). The Egyptian 
economy has resumed its operations in most industries, despite the domestic uprisings 
since the uprisings. The recent, but slowing, growth of 1,4% between 2013 and 2014 
(Trading Economics 2014) shows that. Attempts to improve economic growth by 
improved infrastructure, monetary and fiscal policies are being made continuously.  
Dr. Ashraf El-Araby was announcing a comprehensive reform of investment and 
labor laws to promote foreign direct investment and to enable the setting up of 
Egyptian SMEs. 
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In transit flows, Egypt's Suez Canal, completed in 1869, connects the 
Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, two main rivers directly, via the Red Sea 
(McGregor 2006). Egypt plays a vital role in world commerce and economic growth as a 
gatekeeper between Africa, Asia, and Europe. Today, some 8 percent of container ships 
worldwide bear containers, fewer than the Panama Channel, into the Suez Channel (Cole 
2013). It is expected that this number will increase as the recently planned parallel link to 
the Canal is finished in 20158 (Farid 2014). More than 2 million barrels of oil are 
expected to flow through Egypt through the Canal or pipelines (Yazdani 2015). Turkish, 
French, and American importations of liquefied natural gas were obtained from Suez 
Canal by almost 25% in 2010, making them a focal point on fuel price and trade stability 
(Cole 2013). Any future geopolitical disruption that could contribute to the closure of 
the Suez Canal in Egypt could thus have significant implications for foreign trade, oil 
supply, and prices. When the demonstrations first began in Egypt on January 25, 2011, 




The crisis in Libya has emerged as a result of a diverse and refined series of 
trends in which exogenous forces have greatly affected and guided local political 
activities. In the Euro-Mediterranean and the Inter-Arab divisions, a dual set of 
competing interests is found, with Italy and Turkey fighting France, with Turkey fighting 
Great Britain, and Qatar fighting the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia on the one 
side. A war that was predominantly waged by non-Libyan forces, which ultimately 
prompted the fall of the central institutions in Libya and the formation of thousands of 
Local militias, hit Muammar Gaddafi's rule and which undoubtedly was not a paradigm 
of good governance and respect for human rights. The collapse of both local and 
exogenous aspirations led to the instability that allowed external forces to affect the 
Libyan civil war and made the situation rather complex and challenging to address. 
Turkey and Egypt could benefit from having access to modern, less conventional 
markets and hence more significant interaction with the world economy. Ibrahim El-
Araby, Vice-President of Cairo Chamber of Commerce, affected that “trade practices in 
Egypt are having an immediate effect and are a result of the trade levels in the Arab 
world. In the energy market, Turkey pursued more outlets to meet its rising energy 
demand because of the rapid social and economic changes. Sustainable development 
relies on the availability of energy supply and stability” (Omar 2014). The project to 
move natural gas from Egypt to Turkey through Syria and Jordan has included recent 
projects. This investment will lead to diversifying Turkish fuels and to improving Egypt as 
a transport point in the future.  
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